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Zusammenfassung
Wir erstellen ein hedonisches Preismodell für Qualitätswein aus
Deutschland. Als Indikatoren der Qualität von 4,141 Weinen dienen
die Ergebnisse der sensorischen Prüfung der jährlichen Bundes-
weinprämierung und die Einstufung in die gesetzlichen Qualitäts-
kategorien sowie eine Reihe von Kontrollvariablen wie z.B. regionale
Herkunft, Weinart, Geschmacksrichtung oder das Alter der Weine
zum Zeitpunkt der sensorischen Prüfung. Die Datengrundlage be-
stätigt, dass die Ergebnisse der Prämierung sowie die Qualitäts-
stufen und die meisten der Kontrollvariablen einen signifikanten
Einfluss auf den Preis haben.
Schlüsselwörter
Wein, hedonische Preismodelle, Reputation
Abstract
We develop a hedonic pricing model for German quality wine. Qual-
ity indicators for 4,141 wines are sensory awards received at the
annual German wine competition and the legally required quality
category as well as a set of control variables including regional
origin, color, style, and their age at the time of judging. The data
confirms that sensory quality awards have a significant and positive
price impact. Moreover, we estimate significant relative differences
between quality categories, growing regions and most of the control
variables.
Key words
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1. Introduction
Because any expert appraisal of sensory
wine quality is based on subjective im-
pressions, wine is also classified accord-
ing to legally binding criteria and stan-
dards that are measurable and verifiable.
Such a notion of “quality” is outlined in
wine laws and regulations. The EU wine
law assigns general conditions that apply
to all wine-producing member states, but
takes common interests as well as na-
tional differences into account. For ex-
ample, the vineyard areas in the EU are
divided into climatic zones to help com-
pensate for the climatic variations that influence wine pro-
duction. Similarly, the EU wine law defines quality catego-
ries that enable legally equivalent comparisons among
member states. However, each member state is permitted to
determine the criteria and method of assessment necessary
to meet local (and EU) quality standards.
In some countries, wine quality is closely tied to origin; i.e.
the system is based on given conditions. Quality standards
vary considerably, depending on appellation of origin, and
the qualitative assessment is usually determined by regional
wine trade organizations. However, in Germany quality is
confirmed or denied by official testing. The quality in the
glass rather than origin counts. The standards are largely
uniform and the assessment is determined through quality
control testing. Regulations governing quality categories
and testing are important components of the German wine law.
Germany is the world’s sixth largest wine producer with a
total production of about ten million hectoliters. German
wine is grown in 13 classified regions and renowned for its
white varieties such as Riesling and Müller-Thurgau.
Table  1 provides an overview of production by growing
region. Vineyard area and production quantity remained
relatively steady over the last decade. However, there have
been significant structural changes (DWI, 2001). In par-
ticular, the proportion of red variety vineyards has grown
from 16% to over 26%. Mass producing white varieties are
now declining and the production increasingly focuses on
premium quality wine (STORCHMANN and SCHAMEL, 2002).
In this paper, we analyze an extensive data set of 4,141
wines evaluated during the annual competitions adminis-
tered by the German Agricultural Society (DLG). The he-
donic model includes award level (bronze, silver, gold, gold






Ahr 513 45.6 Pinot Noir
Baden 15,372 1,225.4 Pinot Noir, Müller-Thurgau
Franken 5,925 479.5 Müller-Thurgau, Sylvaner
Hess. Bergstraße 443 41.9 Riesling
Mittelrhein 540 45.0 Riesling
Mosel-Saar-Ruwer 11,042 1,127.6 Riesling
Nahe 4,428 361.4 Riesling
Pfalz 22,606 2,610.5 Riesling, Müller-Thurgau
Rheingau 3,144 275.1 Riesling
Rheinhessen 25,596 2,606.1 Müller-Thurgau, Sylvaner
Saale-Unstrut 621 42.2 Müller-Thurgau, Pinot Blanc
Sachsen 415 23.2 Müller-Thurgau, Riesling
Württemberg 10,903 1,197.2 Trollinger, Riesling
Total 101,548 10,080.8 Riesling, Müller-Thurgau
Source: DWI (2001)Agrarwirtschaft 52 (2003), Heft 5
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extra), wine style (dry, off-dry, mild), barrique aging, color
(red, white, rosé), special quality attributes (e.g. Spätlese,
Auslese), and regional origin (e.g. Baden, Pfalz) as inde-
pendent variables to explain variations in price. We show
that the estimated implicit prices for these quality charac-
teristics are highly significant (except for one regional indi-
cator and rosés) and that they exhibit expected signs and
relative magnitudes. The price premiums for special quality
attributes are significantly larger than the premiums for
competition awards. Moreover, the smaller wine growing
regions (e.g. Ahr, Saxony) receive high price premiums
relative to the larger bulk producing regions.
2. Regulations and quality control
By law, German wines are categorized by the degree of
ripeness, which the grapes have achieved at harvest. Ripe-
ness is determined by the sugar content in the grapes meas-
ured in degree Oechsle. The Oechsle requirements for the
respective categories vary by growing region. They do not
reflect sweetness levels in the finished wine. Riper grapes
provide more aroma and more flavor, hence a more expres-
sive and flavorful wine. Sweetness depends on the wine-
maker’s decision and is independent of wine quality. If the
fermentation process, which converts natural sugar into
alcohol, stops or is interrupted before all sugar is trans-
formed, it will result in sweeter wines. If the fermentation
continues until little or no sugar is left, it results in drier
wines. Grapes for dessert wines have so much natural sugar
that they will not ferment completely and residual sugar
(sweetness) will remain.
German wine producers are required to declare specific
quality categories on their labels. The European Union wine
law mandates two broad quality categories: Table Wine and
Quality Wine. Within these quality categories, the German
wine law specifies more sub-categories than other EU
countries. For example, the table wine category has two
levels: simple table wines (Deutscher Tafelwein) and supe-
rior table wines (Deutscher Landwein). However, we will
not further elaborate on table wines because of our focus on
quality wines in this paper.
Standard quality wine (Qualitätswein - QbA) must be made
exclusively from German produce, be from an approved
grape variety grown in one of the 13 specified wine-
growing regions, and reach an existing alcohol content of at
least 7% by volume. However, winemakers are allowed to
add sugar to QbA wines before fermentation to increase the
alcohol level of the wine. This so-called chaptalization
process is commonly used around the world and adds more
body to otherwise lighter wines.
The quality wine category has six higher-rated sub-
categories identified by special quality attributes (QmP).
1
QmP must be from a certain district within a wine-growing
region and reach a specified natural alcohol content for the
region, grape variety and special attribute category. Chap-
talization is not allowed. The special attribute categories are
subject to additional regulations concerning ripeness,
                                                          
1  QbA = Qualitätswein bestimmter Anbaugebiete (quality wine
             from a specified appellation)
QmP = Qualitätswein mit Prädikat (quality wine with special
             attributes).
method of harvesting, and marketing. In ascending order of
ripeness at harvest the special attribute categories are:
  Kabinett: fine, usually “naturally” light wines made of
fully ripened grapes, low in alcohol, may not be sold
prior to January following the harvest.
  Spätlese: late harvest, from superior quality grapes,
more intense in flavor and concentration than Kabinett,
not necessarily sweet.
  Auslese: from selected, very ripe bunches, noble wines
with intense in bouquet and taste, usually, but not al-
ways sweet.
  Beerenauslese (BA): from selected, overripe berries
(usually Botrytis), harvested only during exceptional
weather conditions, yielding rich, sweet dessert wines
noted for their longevity.
  Eiswein: from grapes as ripe as BA, but harvested and
pressed while frozen, unique wines with a remarkable
concentration of fruit, acidity, and sweetness.
  Trockenbeerenauslese (TBA): from individually
selected, overripe berries (dried up almost to raisins);
rare, rich, lusciously sweet wines with an extraordinary
longevity.
Moreover, note that all special attribute categories except
“Kabinett” wines may not be sold before the month of
March following the year of harvest and that BA and TBA
wines may not be harvested mechanically.
The German wine law also defines four basic wine styles
(dry, off-dry, mild, sweet) in terms of their dryness or
sweetness. Dry (“trocken”) indicates that most of the natu-
ral sugar has been fermented (up to 9 grams/liter of residual
sugar, total acidity must be 2 grams/liter less than residual
sugar content). Off-dry (“halbtrocken”) includes wines with
9-18 grams/liter of residual sugar and total acidity must be
10 grams/liter less than the residual sugar. Mild wine
(“lieblich”) has a residual sugar content between 18 and
45  grams/liter. Sweet wines (“süß”) have more than
45 grams/liter of residual sugar.
The wine regulations have been subject to much criticism
since becoming law in 1971. For example, there are no
yield limits, which have increased without enough regard
for quality. Another problem is that sugar content at harvest
is the only criteria for inclusion into a quality category
although the boundaries between sub-categories (e.g.
Spätlese or Auslese) are adjusted by region. Thus, a higher
sugar content is required for wines from warmer regions
(e.g. Baden) relative to the cooler areas (e.g. Nahe). How-
ever, the required sugar levels for higher-rated categories
are generous. Moreover, some producers declassify wines
reasoning that it is better to offer an excellent QbA rather
than a mediocre Kabinett.
Concurrently to the new wine law coming into force, mod-
ern early-ripening varieties came into production. Whereas
previously a wine labeled “Auslese” indicated a highly
selective harvest in the vineyard and correspondingly high
quality, it now became much easier to produce a high-sugar
content “Auslese” from Ortega grapes. Moreover, it became
perfectly legal to blend Riesling Auslese with a modern
early-ripening variety or to chaptalize a QbA but not a QmP
such that the former was not necessarily inferior to theAgrarwirtschaft 52 (2003), Heft 5
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latter. The potential for abuse became immense and the fine
name that once attached to ‘Auslese’ was degraded.
Many producers acknowledge the inadequacy of the wine
law, but the main regulatory and marketing bodies have
resisted any reforms. As a consequence, leading German
estates have formed associations such as the “Verband
Deutscher Prädikatsweingüter” (VDP) in an effort to
change the system and demand far stricter quality controls
than the current wine law. Many estates have imposed
strong self-regulation, ensuring that anything offered to
consumers under their label is of good quality. Despite the
failings of the wine law, the DLG administers a sound sys-
tem of wine quality control, which we will analyze subse-
quently.
Each German wine, which is labeled as a “quality wine”
first undergoes a critical, blind, sensory testing procedure
based on a uniform five-point scale, devised by the DLG.
For each wine to be tested, producers have to submit an
application for an official quality control test number
(A.P.Nr.)
2. The actual examination procedure is divided
into two rounds: (a) checking specific prerequisites and (b)
examining a wine’s sensory characteristics. In the first
round, the examination panel verifies whether the wine is
typical for the region of origin, grape variety and quality
category stated on the application. Just one negative score
on any of these questions disqualifies a wine from further
assessment. Subsequently, the second round is a sensory
evaluation of three important characteristics: bouquet, taste
and  harmony. “Harmony” embraces all sensory impres-
sions, including color. The overall balance between sweet-
ness and acidity as well as alcohol and body are also con-
sidered. Up to five points or fractions thereof are awarded
for each of the three characteristics. A minimum of
1.5 points (per characteristic) is necessary to avoid rejec-
tion. The total sum of this characteristic score yields an
overall evaluation that is divided by three to determine the
wine’s quality rating number - the wine must achieve at
least 1.5  points in order to receive a quality control test
number (A.P.Nr.).
The DLG and its regional associations use the same testing
procedure and “five-point system” to determine wines of
superior quality, which are worthy of seals, award medals
and prizes. In order to qualify for the German Wine Seal
(Deutsches Weinsiegel), a wine must achieve at least
2.5 points, i.e. achieve a significantly higher quality rating
than required to simply receive a quality control test num-
ber (A.P.Nr.). The German Wine Seal also indicates wine
styles using a color-coding system. Dry wines bear a bright
yellow seal; a lime green seals identifies off-dry wines; and
the red seal is reserved for sweeter wines.
State Chambers of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammern)
award bronze, silver and gold medals that require a mini-
mum of 3.5, 4, and 4.5 points, respectively. These medal-
winning wines are then eligible to enter the annual national
wine competition (Bundesweinprämierung) administered
by the DLG at which they can win bronze, silver and gold
awards (DLG-Prizes). In a special competition, the Gold
Extra Prize (Goldener Preis Extra) may be awarded to
wines that achieve a perfect 5-point score. For consumers,
wine seals, medals and DLG awards are valuable guides to
                                                          
2  A.P.Nr. = Amtliche Prüfnummer
assess the quality of German wine. In the next section, we
briefly review the literature on hedonic price analysis spe-
cifically as related to wine quality indicators.
3. Literature review
A number of studies apply hedonic models to estimate
implicit prices for wine quality attributes. They are based
on the hypothesis that any good represents a bundle of
characteristics that define quality. Theoretical foundation is
the seminal paper by ROSEN (1974), which posits that
goods are valued for their utility-generating attributes.
ROSEN hypothesizes that consumers evaluate these attrib-
utes when making a purchasing decision. The competitive
market price is the sum of implicit prices paid for embodied
product attributes. Rosen recognizes an identification
problem for supply and demand functions derived from
hedonic models, because implicit prices are equilibrium
prices jointly determined by supply and demand conditions.
Thus, implicit prices may not only reflect consumer prefer-
ences but also factors determined through production. In
order to solve the identification problem it is necessary to
separate supply and demand conditions. ARGUEA and
HSIAO (1993) argue that the identification problem is es-
sentially a data issue that can be avoided by pooling cross-
section and time-series data specific to a particular side of
the market. In this paper, we chose not model the supply
side, because we assume a market equilibrium. That is, all
consumers have made their utility-maximizing choices,
given their knowledge of prices, characteristics of alterna-
tive wines and other goods. When making their buying
decision, they use available information on how experts
evaluate a particular wine and how the growing region
succeeds a supplier of quality wine. Moreover, all firms
have made their profit-maximizing decisions given their
production technologies and the costs of alternative wine
qualities producible, and that the resulting prices and quan-
tities clear the market. According to FREEMAN (1992), the
equilibrium assumption implies that implicit prices may be
specified without separately modeling supply conditions.
SHAPIRO (1983) presents a theoretical framework to exam-
ine the effects of producer reputation on prices, assuming
competitive markets and imperfect information. For con-
sumers, it is costly to improve their knowledge about qual-
ity. He demonstrates that reputation allows high-quality
producers to sell their items at a premium which may be
interpreted as return on investments in reputation building.
In an imperfect information environment, learning about
reputation indicators may be an effective way for consum-
ers to reduce their decision-making costs. Since the quality
of a bottle of wine is unknown until it is de-corked, reputa-
tion indicators associated with it will affect consumer will-
ingness to pay. TIROLE (1996) presents a model of collec-
tive reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations
where current producer incentives are affected by their own
actions as well as collective actions of the past. He derives
the existence of stereotype producers from history depend-
ence, shows that new producers may suffer from past mis-
takes of older producers for a long time after the latter dis-
appear, and derives conditions under which the collective
reputation can be regained. GOLAN and SHALIT (1993)
identify and evaluate quality characteristic applying he-Agrarwirtschaft 52 (2003), Heft 5
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donic pricing to wine grapes sold in Israel. Thus, they study
the input supply side of the wine market. They propose that
high-quality wines are produced only when growers are
given strong price incentives to supply better grapes. In a
two-stage model, they first develop a quality index by
evaluating the (relative) contributions of various physical
grape attributes to wine quality. Second, they construct a
quality-price function relating the price of Californian wine
to the quality index developed in the first stage. NERLOVE
(1995) examines the Swedish wine market having no do-
mestic production, a small share of global consumption,
and government controlled prices. He assumes that wine
consumers express their valuation for a particular quality
attribute by varying the derived hedonic demand for it and
estimates a reduced form hedonic price function, regressing
sold quantities on quality attributes and prices. COMBRIS et
al. (1997) estimate a hedonic price equation and what is
referred to as a jury grade equation for Bordeaux wine to
explain the variations in price and quality, respectively.
LANDON and SMITH (1997, 1998) present further empirical
analyses of Bordeaux wine, focusing on reputation indicators
in addition to sensory quality attributes. In both papers, they
study the impact of current quality as well as reputation indi-
cators on consumer behavior using hedonic price functions.
Lagged sensory quality ratings define individual product
reputation. Regional reputation indicators are government
and industry classifications. Their main findings are: reputa-
tion indicators have a large impact on consumer willingness
to pay, an established reputation is considerably more im-
portant than short-term quality improvements, and ignoring
reputation indicators will overstate the impact of current
quality on consumer behavior. The 1997 paper analyzes five
vintages individually (1987-91) and the estimated coeffi-
cients vary substantially across these vintages.
OCZKOWSKI (1994) estimates hedonic price function for
premium Australian wines, examining six attribute groups
and various interaction terms. In another paper, he argues
that single indicators of wine quality and reputation are
imperfect measures because tasters’ evaluations differ and
thus contain measurement errors. Employing factor analysis
and 2SLS, he finds significant reputation effects but insig-
nificant quality effects (OCZKOWSKI, 2001).
ROBERTS and REAGANS (2001) examine market experience,
consumer attention, and price-quality relation-
ships for New World wines in the U.S. They
argue that producer or regional quality signals
improve with the duration of market exposure
and evaluation. Controlling for vintage, blind-
tasted quality, and variety, BROOKS (2001) ap-
plies hedonic price analysis to study the effect of
country-of-origin brands on international com-
petitiveness. Comparing price residuals across-
countries suggests that international brands can
affect a wine bottle’s price in excess of fifty
percent. SCHAMEL and ANDERSON (2003) evalu-
ate wine quality and regional reputation indica-
tors for Australia and New Zealand. In each
country, price premiums associated with sensory
quality ratings, and winery ratings are highly
significant. For Australia, regional reputations in
general are becoming increasingly significant
through time, indicating intensifying regional
quality differentiation. For New Zealand, regional quality
differentiation is also significant, although less than in
Australia.
SCHAMEL (2000) estimates a hedonic model for the U.S.
market with sensory quality ratings for a white and a red
variety (Cabernet Sauvignon and Chardonnay) from seven
different wine-growing regions. The estimated price elas-
ticity of sensory quality is larger for white wine, indicating
that consumers were willing to pay a higher quality pre-
mium for white compared to red wine. However, the results
suggest both regional reputation and individual quality
indicators seem to be more important to U.S. consumers of
red wine. The results also suggest the public-good value of
a regional appellation is higher for red wine regions and
that individual producers in those regions may benefit more
from collective marketing efforts. In another paper,
SCHAMEL (2002) argues that as quality indicators improve
over time, spillovers will affect other producers within a
region. Quality indicators for premium California wine are
medals awarded during nine annual wine competitions,
variety, regional origin, judging age as well as derived
producer (brand) and regional reputation indicators. Esti-
mating a hedonic model, the data confirms that a wine’s
price is significantly related to its own quality as well as to
historically accumulated producer and regional reputation
indicators for quality.
4. Data and analysis
We analyze quality indicators for German wine admitted to
the annual national wine competition (Bundeswein-
prämierung). The results of the competition are published in
print and via the Internet (DLG, 2001). The original data set
extracted from the Internet consisted of 4,281 observations.
The sample size used for the estimation procedure was
reduced to 4,141 because 140 wines listed no price infor-
mation. However, for most wines, producers state a retail
price per bottle on the submission form before entering the
competition. Therefore, the price information is pre-
competition and does not reflect any direct effects from
awarded medals. Table 2 presents the distribution of medals
(Bronze, Silver, Gold, and Gold Extra) by growing region.
Overall, 19.5% of all medals awarded are Bronze, 36.5%
Table 2. Distribution of medal winners by region
Region Bronze Silver Gold Gold Extra All
Ahr 0.5% 1.1% 1.3% 1.3% 1.1%
Baden 5.7% 11.5% 17.6% 23.1% 13.2%
Franken 11.0% 9.5% 9.9% 1.3% 9.8%
Hess. Bergstraße 1.3% 1.6% 2.2% 2.5% 1.8%
Mittelrhein 1.3% 2.9% 1.8% 1.3% 2.1%
Mosel-Saar-Ruwer 18.8% 9.8% 5.1% 2.6% 9.4%
Nahe 3.6% 3.7% 3.0% 1.3% 3.4%
Pfalz 22.6% 19.1% 19.9% 26.9% 20.2%
Rheingau 5.3% 4.2% 3.0% 2.5% 3.9%
Rheinhessen 18.2% 14.6% 14.4% 16.7% 15.2%
Saale-Unstrut 0.9% 1.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.7%
Sachsen 2.0% 1.2% 0.4% 0.0% 1.0%
Württemberg 8.8% 19.8% 21.1% 20.5% 18.2%
Source: DLG (2001), own calculationsAgrarwirtschaft 52 (2003), Heft 5
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are Silver, 42.1% are Gold and 1.9% are Gold Extra.
3 The
model employs dummy variables for the medals as an indi-
cator of sensory quality in addition to the quality attributes
(e.g. Spätlese, Auslese) ensuing from the wine law. The
data set also denotes wine style, color, regional origin, age
at the time of judging, and whether or not the wine was
aged in barrique (oak barrels). Table 3 lists the independent
variables used in the model. All independent variables are
categorical dummies, except for judging age and Barrique
(regular dummy). The dependent variable in the model is
the logarithm of the retail price [log(Price)].
In table 4, we summarize frequencies and price statistics
differentiating the four prize levels, seven quality catego-
ries, wine style, color as well as the 13 classified wine re-
gions. Over 42% of the sample were awarded the DLG
Gold prize and more than a third of the sample was catego-
rized “Spätlese.” Moreover, it contains about 68% white
wine, 29.5% red wine, and 2.5% rosé. The average nominal
price is 8.96 € (range 2.05€ – 184 €).
4 For the estimation,
“Gold” was selected as base award, “Pfalz” as base region,
“Spätlese” as base quality attribute, and dry/white as base
style/color category. The regional ranking of award win-
ning wines reflected by the relative frequencies differs
somewhat from the production shares with the smaller
regions winning a more than proportional large share of
medals.
The theory of hedonic pricing models is well documented
in the literature (e.g. NERLOVE, 1995). Therefore, we ne-
glect a detailed exposition. We hypothesize that consumers
are uncertain about wine quality and their willingness to
pay depends on quality evaluations from DLG awards re-
ceived. Control variables include a set of indicators for
quality attribute, wine style and color, growing region as
well as the age of the wine at the time of judging as we can
expect that older wines should achieve higher prices.
Building on the seminal work by ROSEN (1974), we assume
                                                          
3  The skewed distribution in the awards is a weakness in the
data. However, in recent years an effort was made to toughen
the annual national competition in order to improve the credi-
bility of the quality indicator.
4  It is interesting to note that both the cheapest and the most
expensive wine in the sample received a Gold prize. Moreo-
ver, the least expensive Gold Extra prize wine is a bargain at
3.48 €.
that the price of a particular wine i (Pi) as a function of its
characteristics zj:
(1) ) ..., , ..., , ( in ij 1 i i i z z z P P 
We employ a log-linear function for the estimation. Fol-
lowing OCZKOWSKI (1994), we used a RESET test which
rejected other functional forms (i.e. inverse, linear).
5 Thus,
we estimate the following multivariate regression model:
(2) log(Pi) = α + β1 Di Award + β2 Di Quality level + β3 Di Style +
β4 Di Color + β5 Di Region + γAgei + δBari + εi
where log(Pi) is the logarithm of the retail price
Pi and the error term εi is distributed identically
and independently with a zero mean and uniform
variance. Given the functional form and the na-
ture of the categorical dummies for award, qual-
ity level, style, color and region (Di), the estima-
tion of equation (2) yields price premiums and
discounts βi (i =1, ... 5) relative to the contribu-
tion of the base category (Gold, dry, white
Spätlese from the Pfalz region). Specifically, β1 is
the coefficient for the medal received, β2 for the
quality attribute, β3 for wine style, β4 for color,
and β5 for regional origin. The coefficients γ and
δ measure the price premiums paid for older
wines and barrique-aged wine, respectively. Ac-
cording to HALVORSEN and PALMQUIST (1980),
appropriate adjustments are to be made to interpret the
estimated dummy coefficients as percentage premiums or
discounts.
5. Estimation results
Table 5 lists the regression results for the model defined in
equation (2). The last column translates the estimated coef-
ficients into money equivalents relative to the base category
(a dry-white Gold award winning Spätlese from Pfalz) at
the average price in the sample (= 8.96 €). As expected,
prices are positively related to the sensory evaluation
(DLG-prize medal) and wines receiving higher ranking
awards command significantly higher prices. Ceteris pari-
bus, the discount for a Silver (Bronze) award relative to a
Gold is 3.4% (7.5%) and the premium for a Gold Extra
prize is 11.2%. In monetary terms, the discount for a Silver
(Bronze) award relative to a base category wine is equal to
about 30¢ (67¢) while the premium for a Gold Extra prize
is roughly 1 €. These numbers are in contrast to much
larger price differentials for the quality attributes, which are
all highly significant. For example, an “Auslese” com-
mands more than a 50% premium relative to a Spätlese,
other things equal. As expected, specialty wines such as
TBA or Eiswein receive premiums well above 100%. Bar-
rique-aged wine carries a high premium of about 7 €. With
respect to style and color, dry reds carry a premium relative
to non-dry whites. However, there is hardly a price differ-
ential between mild and off-dry styles (11.6% vs. 10.9%).
The price premium for red wine is 19.7%, which may help
to explain why the proportion of red variety vineyards has
grown from 16% to over 26% in recent years.
                                                          
5  For the log-linear functional form, the RESET statistic
(F-Test) equaled 1.24.
Table 3. Description of independent variables
Variable Parameters
Award Gold Extra, GOLD*, Silver, Bronze
Quality
Level
Qualitätswein (QbA), Kabinett, SPÄTLESE*, Auslese,
Beerenauslese (BA), Trockenbeerenauslese (TBA), Eiswein
Wine Style lieblich/mild, halbtrocken, TROCKEN*, Barrique
Color Weißwein, Rosé, ROTWEIN*
Regions Ahr, Baden, Franken, Hessische Bergstraße, Mittelrhein,
Mosel-Saar-Ruwer, Nahe, PFALZ*, Rheingau,
Rheinhessen, Saale-Unstrut, Sachsen, Württemberg
Age 1 – 5 Years
* Parameters in BOLD are chosen as base category.
Source: own description.Agrarwirtschaft 52 (2003), Heft 5
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Price differentials for the 13 classified wine regions are all
significant and positive relative to the base region Pfalz
(other things equal). Rheinhessen being the largest region in
terms of vineyard area is the only exception. In Pfalz and
Rheinhessen, vineyard area and production is far larger than
in the other regions (see table 1). They produce the bulk of
German quality wine and as large regions are less suited to
command a regional premium. Many of the smaller regions
(e.g. Ahr and Saxony) carry very large price premiums,
which would indicate that they have been quite successful
in niche marketing their premium wines.
Overall, the results indicate that although the sensory qual-
ity indicator is significant, special quality attribute and
regional effects dominate. The explanatory power of the
model is good (F = 512.66, adj. R
2 =
76.94%) and the data set confirms strong
positive price effects for quality indica-
tors such as competition prizes awarded
and quality attribute.
6. Summary and conclusion
In Germany, wine quality is confirmed or
denied by official testing. The German
wine law categorizes wines by their de-
gree of ripeness at harvest. It also defines
four basic wine styles in terms of residual
sugar content and total acidity. Producers
are required to declare specific quality
categories on their labels. The quality
wine category has six higher-rated sub-
categories identified by special quality
attributes (QmP). The German wine law,
which is quite different from regulations
in other EU countries, has been subject to
much criticism especially because sugar
content at harvest is the sole criterion for
inclusion into a special quality attribute
category.
In addition to the quality categorization
by law, the DLG administers a critical
and blind, sensory testing procedure
based on a uniform five-point scale for
every German “quality wine”. In an an-
nual national wine competition (Bunde-
sweinprämierung) bronze, silver and gold
prizes as well as special Gold Extra
Prizes are awarded. DLG-awards provide
a valuable guide for consumers to assess
the quality of German wine and in our
analysis we confirm that they have a
highly significant and positive impact on
the prices for premium wines, even after
correcting for legal quality categorization
and regional origin. This is consistent
with various other studies based on qual-
ity ratings. However, the estimated pre-
miums for individual wine quality appear
to be small in the context of quality as-
sessments at wine competitions as well as
relative to estimated premiums based on
the quality categories. This result is in
line with a study of premium California
wine tasted and evaluated at multiple wine competitions
(SCHAMEL, 2002). Moreover, the results indicate that al-
though the sensory quality indicators are significant, special
quality category and regional effects dominate.
We estimate significant relative differences between quality
categories and between growing regions, which warrant
important marketing implications for quality categories as
well as individual producers and their regional and sub-
regional associations. From the estimation, it follows that
for specialty wines (esp. BA, TBA, Eiswein) quality cate-
gorization seems to work quite well. However, in the lower
categories, the estimated differences are smaller such that
Silver vs. Bronze (36¢) yields about the same premium as
Table 4. Summary statistics
Frequency Price (€)
Count Relative Average Median Std. dev.
Award              Bronze 809 19.5% 6.49 4.96 6.42
Silver 1,511 36.5% 7.41 5.34 7.39
Gold 1,743 42.1% 11.07 6.90 13.83
Gold Extra 78 1.9% 17.36 11.96 20.84
Quality level        QbA 958 23.1% 5.73 4.57 3.32
Kabinett 710 17.2% 4.62 4.35 1.34
Spätlese 1,412 34.1% 6.41 5.88 2.50
Auslese 586 14.2% 10.16 8.69 5.51
BA 182 4.4% 19.21 14.83 13.41
TBA 57 1.4% 34.68 19.94 38.81
Eiswein 236 5.7% 33.34 25.54 22.45
Style               Barrique 218 5.3% 13.62 12.27 6.76
lieblich (mild) 1,949 47.1% 11.69 6.44 15.18
halbtrocken (off-dry) 639 15.4% 5.18 4.55 2.60
trocken (dry) 1,553 37.5% 7.09 6.08 3.77
Color                   Rosé 101 2.4% 12.54 4.86 17.02
Red Wine 1,221 29.5% 7.28 6.14 4.25
White Wine 2,819 68.1% 9.56 5.75 12.60
Regions                 Ahr 44 1.1% 13.16 10.74 8.29
Baden 545 13.2% 10.53 7.16 9.05
Franken 406 9.8% 12.14 7.67 13.11
Hess. Bergstraße 75 1.8% 13.83 6.14 21.00
Mittelrhein 87 2.1% 5.65 4.70 2.79
Mosel-Saar-Ruwer 391 9.4% 10.91 5.62 17.14
Nahe 139 3.4% 7.82 5.62 5.78
Pfalz 838 20.2% 7.06 4.86 7.18
Rheingau 160 3.9% 9.85 6.14 11.82
Rheinhessen 631 15.2% 8.20 4.86 14.20
Saale-Unstrut 30 0.7% 7.97 7.18 2.69
Sachsen 42 1.0% 10.67 8.69 8.34
Württemberg 753 18.2% 7.48 5.62 5.55
Age                    1 Year 3,862 93.3% 8.75 5.62 11.07
2 Years 246 5.9% 11.55 9.20 9.18
3+ Years 33 0.8% 14.36 10.23 15.93
Vintage             ≤ 1996 32 0.8% 14.15 7.67 18.48
1997 126 3.0% 11.74 10.18 9.23
1998 466 11.3% 12.18 7.16 17.06
1999 3,517 84.9% 8.39 5.62 9.83
Full sample 4,141 100.0% 8.96 5.85 11.04
Sources: DLG (2001), own calculationsAgrarwirtschaft 52 (2003), Heft 5
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Kabinett vs. QbA (40¢). Thus, the strategy of some produc-
ers to declassify their wines (e.g. reasoning that it is better
to offer an excellent QbA rather than a mediocre Kabinett)
is reconfirmed through the data. Critics of the German wine
law argue that the reputation of the quality categories has
degraded. However, the reputation of a quality category has
public good properties and it is crucial to promote its value.
Here, TIROLE’S (1996) model of collective reputation ap-
plies to quality categories. The collective reputation for a
specific wine quality attribute is an aggregate indicator.
When producers declassify their wine their incentives seem
to be affected by collective actions of the past. Following
TIROLE (1996), regaining collective reputation depends on
producer eagerness, the trust level required by consumers,
and on free riders.
Our results point towards the need for greater regional dif-
ferentiation. In their search for more knowledge about wine
quality, discerning consumers value more specific informa-
tion. It seems that the degree of regional differentiation in
Germany is mainly a result of the wine law and is not re-
flecting recent industry trends. We confirm positive price
effects for sensory quality indicators such as competition
prizes awarded. However, price-quality relationships de-
pend on the performance of producers over time and of
other producers in the same region. As consumers become
aware of producer (brand) or sub-regional quality and
reputation indicators, they will pay more attention to pro-
ducer and site-specific quality signals. At the same
time, they become less reliant on more diffuse sig-
nals, such as special quality attributes specified by the
wine law which may blur the supremacy of distinct
vineyard sites in larger regions. Efforts by leading
German wine estates to change the current regulatory
system and to demand stricter quality controls point
in this direction. They strive for stronger property
rights and value in sub-regional or site names,
thereby raising the rates of return on individual pro-
motion efforts. Then, the French tradition of empha-
sizing regional origin would take hold in Germany.
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Zusammenfassung
Neben der multiattributiven Einstellungsmessung und der Conjoint-
Analyse werden in der jüngeren Zeit auch Discrete-Choice-Modelle zur
Präferenzanalyse eingesetzt. Diese Modelle basieren auf der Zufalls-
nutzentheorie und haben im Gegensatz zur Conjoint-Analyse eine
direkte Verbindung zur mikroökonomischen Nutzentheorie. Eine
vergleichende Gegenüberstellung beider Verfahren lässt vor allem
auf einer theoretischen Ebene deutliche komparative Vorteile von
Discrete-Choice-Modellen erkennen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird
mit Hilfe des Discrete-Choice-Ansatzes untersucht, welchen Ein-
fluss der Produktpreis und das neu eingeführte Bio-Siegel auf das
Produktwahlverhalten bei ökologisch produzierten Wurstwaren
haben. Während Konsumenten, die nur gelegentlich Bioprodukte
kaufen, sehr preiselastisch auf alle drei untersuchten Produkte
reagieren, orientieren sich Bio-Stammkunden eher am Bio-Siegel als
am Preis. Allerdings profitieren die Anbieter von ökologisch erzeugten
Wurstwaren nicht gleichermaßen von der Einführung des Bio-Siegels.
Schlüsselwörter
Discrete-Choice-Analyse, Conjoint-Analyse, Verbraucherverhalten,
Präferenzen für ökologische Lebensmittel, Bio-Siegel
Abstract
Preferences for food products are usually analysed employing
multi-attributive Attitude Measurement, Conjoint Analysis and re-
cently Discrete Choice Modelling approaches. From a theoretical
point of view, Choice Modelling based on random utility theory
(RUT) outperforms traditional Conjoint Analysis because of its
microeconomic foundation. In this article, consumers' choice be-
haviour on ecologically produced sausages is analysed. A market
experiment reveals brand specific reactions towards the 'Bio-
Siegel', a German quality label for organic food introduced in 2002. It
can also be shown that regular customers of organic food are much
less price sensitive than occasional buyers.
Key words
choice modelling, conjoint analysis, consumer behaviour,
preferences for ecological food, eco-labelling
1. Einleitung
Die Erklärung von Kaufentscheidungsprozessen ist ein zen-
trales Aufgabenfeld der Agrarmarktforschung. Auf aggre-
gierter Produktebene werden vor allem solche Variablen als
Erklärungsgrößen für das Kaufverhalten herangezogen, die
in amtlichen Statistiken verfügbar sind (z.B. Produktpreise,
Kreuzpreise, sozioökonomische Größen). In einem Marke-
tingkontext stellt sich demgegenüber eher die Frage, welche
Produkteigenschaften für die Wahl einer bestimmten Marke
oder Produktvariante entscheidend sind. Die Kenntnis über